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In response to Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Au-
thority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 63 (2007). 
 
“It’s only meant to be persuasive, not binding.”  Thus runs, man-
tra-like, our blanket, disarming defense—against plausible objec-
tions—of judicial invocations of foreign law in U.S. constitutional 
cases.  Professor Youngjae Lee’s manifest urge to burst this bubble 
feels entirely right to me.
1
 
I further like the boldness of Professor Lee’s strategy.  The data 
presented by Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Roper v. Sim-
mons would seem to be special in purporting to show a literally 
unanimous, worldwide rejection of the juvenile death penalty outside 
of the United States.
2
  If even such a total worldwide consensus could 
be shown to lack instructiveness when applying the Eighth Amend-
ment’s Punishments Clause,
3
 then surely—I take Professor Lee to be 
suggesting—no divided, brute nose-count of foreign law outcomes 
could be thought instructive, at least in the Punishments Clause con-
text.  Professor Lee thus sets for himself the task of establishing—
against our predictable, strong intuitions—the negligible epistemic 
value, in this context, of even an external unanimity (let alone a mere 
majority) of outcomes.  That task is daunting because, as I shall ex-
plain, data showing a unanimous worldwide rejection of the death 
penalty for juveniles seem especially resilient to challenges to instruc-
tiveness such as those marshaled by Professor Lee.  (I deal here only 
with the central issue raised by Professor Lee’s article, that of the per-
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So far as I am aware, virtually every country has laws regulating 
which punishments are available for which offenses and which of-
fenders.  Many rule out capital punishment altogether, but many do 
not.  I know of no general reason to suspect that judges, lawmakers, 
and citizenries the world over approach the matter of punishment 
calibration with any less sane and sincere an eye to the merits as we 
would strive for.  Nor do I see any general reason to doubt that decid-
ers abroad, at least in a sizeable fraction of the world’s countries, 
would roughly understand the merits to be composed of some mix of 
considerations resembling those that we would use, of culpability and 
desert, deterrence, and rehabilitative potential.  (Note that this has 
little to do with the undoubted existence of intractable metaethical 
controversy among philosophical professionals—utilitarians, deon-
tologists, and so on.
5
  It is about what factors we think actually moti-
vate the punishment calibration choices of practicing politicians and 
judges.) 
We know, moreover, that many of these countries resemble us in 
additional ways that seem germane to the normative question at hand.  
They differentiate childhood from adulthood for sundry purposes of 
public policy and administration; they regard children as being less 
self-directing and responsible than adults; and they also believe that 
children are more salvageable because the young are less set in their 
ways.  It is no doubt true that understandings in some countries vary 
markedly from ours in those very respects, along with others that 
might affect the normative choice.  Yet, still speaking generally, other 
countries’ differences from us do not seem to swamp their differences 
from each other, a point that makes their unanimous rejection of the 
juvenile death penalty all the more striking.  I do not perceive—and 
Professor Lee does not specify—any particular, relevant, conditioning 
factor that makes us an all-purpose outlier relative to all or nearly all 
of the rest of the world. 
Against that background, the fact that not a single other country 
in the world currently sees fit to expose juvenile offenders to capital 
punishment hits one between the eyes as a reality that—as I shall ar-
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gue—a conscientious Justice in Roper could not have ignored.  If the 
Justice was leaning against a finding of Eighth Amendment violation, 
at the moment when he came upon the external-consensus informa-
tion, then the receipt of it should have given him pause, at least to the 
point of pushing him to consider (a) what factors, specifically and 
concretely, might make the best answer different for his country than 
for any and every other country in existence, and/or (b) what reason 
in general (and not just with regard to some selected countries) he has 
for doubting the competence, focus, or sincerity of decision makers 
elsewhere.  If, at the moment of reception, the judge was in exquisite 
equipoise on the Eighth Amendment question, then the consensus 
data should in all reason have figured for him as a deciding factor.  If 
he was leaning towards a finding of violation, he could rightly have 
taken comfort from the data, allowing them to ease whatever residual 
qualms he might have had about his pending merits judgment. 
So says prima facie intuition, and prima facie intuition here has 
technical, qualified backing from the well-known Condorcet Jury 
Theorem, as explained at length in a recent article by Professors Eric 
Posner and Cass Sunstein.
6
  The account I am about to offer of the 
epistemic value of the consensus data in Roper amounts to a less for-
mal, more intuitive rendition of their qualified jury-theoretic argu-
ment, with an added suggestion that worldwide unanimity tends 
strongly to sideline some of their qualifications. 
We can start where Professor Lee does, with an arguendo assump-
tion drawn from his prior studies of America’s Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence to date.
7
  A due respect for this jurisprudence, Professor 
Lee claims, would commit our current Court to treating the question 
of a punishment’s fitness as exclusively one of just deserts—of “pro-
portionality” in a highly purist, or what I shall call a “strict,” sense of 
that term.
8
  For Punishments Clause purposes, Professor Lee pro-
poses, fitness is all and only a matter of the severity of the punishment 
as weighed against the gravity of the offense—of the punishment fit-
ting the crime in that assiduously (one might almost say aggressively) 
nonconsequentialist sense.
9
  Suppose we accept this framing of the 
question in Roper.  How does that affect the instructiveness of a world-
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wide rejection of death as a permissible punishment for juvenile of-
fenders? 
Professor Lee shows convincingly that the whole world could 
agree on strict proportionality as the test of punitive fitness, and yet 
countries could split apart in their yes-no conclusions regarding a 
given punishment for a given offense and still all be responding cor-
rectly.  Given the wide variations of cultural, social, and institutional 
conditions among the world’s peoples, we can be sure that locally au-
thentic perceptions regarding the severity of death relative to other 
punishments will differ markedly; they might also differ over whether 
murder (say) is always or sometimes the gravest of offenses (as com-
pared, say, with torturing), and also over how much, if at all, a perpe-
trator’s youth diminishes the gravity of an offense.
10
  In sum, as Profes-
sor Lee contends, since societies doubtless will differ widely in their 
genuine perceptions of the quantities in both pans of the scale in any 
given case or class of cases, there can be no striking of the balance 
that is right for everyone—from which it follows, Professor Lee thinks, 
that a cross-society nose-count on a question of the proportionality of 
a given punishment to a given class of offenses is void of epistemic 
value to any particular society.
11
 
There surely is something to this line of thought.  Suppose we find 
the world’s countries divided on the use of prison sentences in excess 
of fifteen years for the offense of embezzling from an employer, with a 
clear majority never crossing the fifteen-year line.  The kinds of con-
siderations advanced by Professor Lee counsel strongly against any 
particular country’s reliance on that brute nose-count as being infor-
mative for it on the question of the strict proportionality of a sentence 
in excess of fifteen years as punishment for embezzlement from an 
employer.  But now suppose the dispute is over the strict proportional-
ity of a forty-year sentence (throw away the key) for first-time con-
victed embezzlers, and we find that over the past quarter century—
during which period convictions for such crimes have regularly oc-
curred everywhere—no other country in the world has imposed a sen-
tence in excess of ten years.  Are those data epistemically valueless? 
How many countries are there in the world where we would ex-
pect people, by and large, to see both the heinousness of embezzle-
ment relative to other crimes and the severity gap between a ten-year 
and a forty-year jail term roughly as we would?  Might the number of 
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these relevantly like-minded countries approach or exceed, say, ten?  
On the standard jury-theoretic analysis, a bare majority (let alone a 
perfect consensus) of a group of ten judges—all of them applying the 
same standard, each of them being conceded a materially better-than-
even chance of getting the judgment right—enjoys an imposing prob-
ability of having reached the right answer, the probability rising with 
the number of judges.
12
  Of course, this assumes they are all address-
ing the same issue,
13
 and the point is that in the group of relevantly 
like-minded countries we have in view here (whatever you think their 
number may be) they all would be. 
Notice, now, how the question of the permissibility of the death 
penalty for juveniles fits the mold.  Among inquirers who share a view 
of death as a unique, extraordinary, and maximally severe punish-
ment, and who also think roughly alike about a pre-adult life-cycle 
phase of diminished responsibility, the yes-no question of whether 
death may ever be a fitting punishment for a juvenile perpetrator, no 
matter the crime, is one that has a right answer in principle.  So the 
test for the epistemic value of a perfect consensus against ever permit-
ting capital punishment for juveniles, in a worldwide sample that can 
be presumed to include some number of relevantly like-minded coun-
tries, again becomes what you think that number is:  the more of them 
there are, the greater the epistemic value, but there is some such value 
even if there are only a very few of them. 
Note that it does not matter that quite a few countries in the 
worldwide sample—this is Professor Lee’s point—are surely not rele-
vantly like-minded with us.  All that matters is whether, on considera-
tion, you believe that some of them surely are.  That is because the 
worldwide-consensus fact tells us that, whatever number of relevantly 
like-minded countries the sample contains, not a single one of them 
dissents from the flat rejection of death as a fitting punishment for ju-
veniles.  It so informs us, pace Professor Lee, however true it also is 
that any randomly selected country in the worldwide bunch “may” 
think vastly differently than we do about the severity of death, or 
about the necessity for it in order to induce a desired level of deter-
rence, or about the responsibility of juveniles.
14
 
Of course it is, as Professor Lee says, “possible”—in the sense of 
conceivable—that we Americans take death-as-punishment less seri-
ously than literally everyone else, or that we alone have the spine to give 
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juvenile offenders what they really and truly deserve.
15
  Conceivability, 
however, is not the question.  The question for the conscientious 
American decider is whether she honestly believes that we are thus 
unique (not to say peculiar), or rather believes something like the op-
posite:  that the probability is strong that the number of the world’s 
relevantly like-minded societies—societies from which we do not differ 
markedly in the pertinent respects—is large enough to sustain the in-
structiveness for us of the external world’s unanimous rejection of the 
juvenile death penalty.  Nor, again pace Professor Lee, does logic re-
quire that our deciders first identify the supposedly compatible coun-
tries and cross-examine them for their reasons, before such a belief on 
the deciders’ part can be robust enough to warrant their attention to 
the consensus.
16
  For that, a general conversance with life and society 
in a few other parts of the world, gained through education, books, 
the media, and perhaps some travel, will suffice.  Professor Lee is set-
ting the bar unnecessarily high. 
But cannot Professor Lee cogently object that America (or at any 
rate our Punishments Clause) really may be unique in a different re-
spect—that of treating the fitness-of-punishment question as one of 
strict desert or proportionality, excluding consequentialist considera-
tions of deterrence and salvation?
17
  He cannot, although the objec-
tion does force a slight recasting of my claim about the likely relevant 
comparability to us of at least a handful of other countries.  Allowing 
that the American doctrine is as Professor Lee proposes, I remain on 
safe ground as long as we think that any given country’s exceptionless 
rule against ever applying a given punishment to a given offense-
category can normally be taken to reflect a belief in the categorical 
disproportionality of that punishment to that category on the part of 
that country’s deciders, at least for countries otherwise falling within 
our group of the relevantly like-minded.  Does anyone really doubt 
that that is what is going on in many of the countries in our data set?  
If not, then the flat refusal of those countries ever to permit death as a 
punishment for juveniles must be taken to convey their several judg-
ments that death is never plausibly a proportionate punishment for a 
juvenile offense, which is exactly the question that Professor Lee says 





See id. at 110 (“[I]t is possible that an overlapping consensus can indeed help us 
improve our moral deliberations, but only if we are able to peek behind the consensus 
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2008] SETTING THE BAR TOO HIGH 397 
All of that being so, the stark fact that absolutely all of the rest of 
the world rejects the juvenile death penalty is one that our merits-
seeking Justice has solid reason to notice, and even to treat as decisive 
if he lacks his own conviction on the ultimate question of fitness that 
confronts him.  That is not because (as in the aesthetic-judgment case 
that Professor Lee discusses
18
) the rest are presumed to be trained, in-
culcated, or expert in ways that he is not, but simply because they can 
be presumed to be, on average, his peers in these respects.  He cannot 
reject their consensus on the jury-theoretic ground of their each hav-
ing a less-than-even chance of getting the fitness judgment right with-
out impeaching his own pretension to judging proportionality cor-
rectly. 
Note, please, that I do not base my claim for the instructiveness of 
a worldwide consensus on any notion of a least-common-denominator, 
cancellation-of-differences sort of “wisdom of crowds.”
19
  I speak only 
of the instructiveness of the unanimity of that subset of relevantly 
comparable countries (comprising something like Professor Lee’s 
“Dignity Society”
20
) that almost certainly lie ensconced within the 
worldwide crowd.  If Justice Scalia should happen to be listening:  Be-
ing unanimous, this is not a crowd out of which anyone needs to pick 
their friends; all you need to know is that your “friends”—the rele-
vantly comparable countries—are out there somewhere, even if in 
merely modest numbers.  Now, it certainly does not hurt my case to 
notice that also out there in that motley consensus are countries rele-
vantly quite different from us.
21
  But my argument does not rely at all 
on that observation. 
Having said all that, I must now confess to some unease about Pro-
fessor Lee’s stipulation of strict proportionality as the sovereign 
American guide to determining a punishment’s fitness.  To my read-
ing (admittedly untutored in the niceties of our punishment jurispru-
dence), the Roper opinion uses the term “proportionality” in some not-
so-purist sense, treating desert as a dominant concern in American 
judgments of the fitness of punishments, but allowing that consequen-
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tialist considerations of deterrence and salvation can also have a bear-
ing.
22
  (Accurately and unprotestingly, Professor Lee himself describes 
the Roper Court’s “proportionality analysis” as including its considered 
judgment that neither “deterrence” nor “retribution” can justify the 
death penalty for juveniles.
23
)  Perhaps we could say that proportional-
ity provides the frame within which the more consequentialist-looking 
factors get to say their pieces in the American discourse of punish-
ment. 
I am not qualified to wrestle with Professor Lee over whether that 
might be the better reading, and I shall not.  My intention at this 
point is merely defensive.  I need to establish that if our notion of the 
proper American test for acceptability of a punishment does deviate 
from strict proportionality so as to admit considerations of deterrence 
and salvation, that fact will do no harm to my claim for the instruc-
tiveness, for us, of the worldwide unanimous rejection of the juvenile 
death penalty. 
Of course, it must be taken as true, as Professor Lee insists, that 
the relative weights assigned to considerations of proportionality, de-
terrence, and salvation vary markedly among countries; and further-
more that a myriad of other historical-contextual, political, institu-
tional, and cultural variables enter into any given society’s intuitions 
of overall fitness; and still furthermore that there is no reason to as-
sume that any other country’s profile on this multidimensional, 
causal-influential space is an exact match to ours.
24
  But neither is 
there any reason to assume the opposite:  that vanishingly few of those 
other countries are a relevantly close match for us—that in dimension 
after dimension after dimension, we are sitting in Pluto-position rela-
tive to the means or the regression lines that any more-than-minuscule 
subgroup of the rest would comprise.  So my argument remains on 
track.  The presumption of epistemic value in the face of worldwide 
unanimity holds, and to refuse that fact entry into our own merits-
seeking deliberations is unintelligent. 
There is one further worry, one that Professor Lee treats as make-
weight but that I regard as the most formidable objection to be raised 
against a U.S. decider’s treating as instructive the sort of consensus 
 
22
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571-72 (2005) (suggesting that the an-
swer to the constitutional question may be affected by evidence regarding the deter-
rent effect of the death penalty on juveniles). 
23
See Lee, supra note 1, at 75. 
24
See id. at 107 (listing special facts about the United States that may color our 
moral considerations of juvenile culpability). 
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that figures in Roper.  We need to think about what may be motivating 
the choices of later-coming adherents to consensuses as we finally see 
them.
25
  If our grounds become too strong (and the very fact of una-
nimity might be one) for suspecting that later-arriving participants 
have just gone along with the crowd, so that their “votes” do not re-
flect their several independent judgments, the jury-theoretic, epis-
temic value of the resulting consensus is drastically reduced.
26
  A full 
assessment requires deeper investigation than I can supply here and 
now, leaving me simply to say that this is where any remaining battle 
over Roper-style use of foreign-law consensus information in Punish-
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